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Intermediation in markets is a phenomenon that has been studied by many researchers 
from a variety of different theoretical angles. With the introduction and diffusion of the 
Internet in everyday life, broad predictions were made that called for disintermediation 
enabled by direct Internet linkages between suppliers and buyers and lower transaction 
costs. The often-cited paper by Sarkar, Butler and Steinfield (1995) challenges this 
prediction. By comparing Internet effects on transaction costs with the cost situation ex 
ante, the paper explains that both direct sales or cybermediated sales are possible 
outcomes. In this paper we confront key assumptions of the Sarkar et al. paper with 
recent developments in the tourism market. We find that in the tourism market a 
multitude of direct and indirect distribution channels exist next to each other. Multi-
level distribution channels often including several cybermediaries have been built, 
resulting in a complex market topology. We also see a large variety of intermediary 
roles, resulting from highly specialized and highly integrated cybermediary business 
models. Furthermore the model of Sarkar et al. fails to deliver an explanation for the 
on-going dynamics in the tourism market in terms of shifts towards more or less 
intermediaries and the emergence of new intermediary-like business models. By taking 
these trends into account we are able to identify relevant future research directions in 
order to extend our understanding of the phenomenon of electronic intermediaries in 
markets. 
 
Keywords: Cybermediaries, Intermediation, Electronic Intermediaries, Electronic 
Markets, Disintermediation Hypothesis, Tourism Industry 
 




The terms „cybermediary‟, „electronic intermediary‟, „electronic intermediation‟ and 
„disintermediation‟ are widespread and frequently used in the field of e-business 
research (Dai & Kauffman, 2002; Fielt, 2006; Giaglis, Klein, & O'Keefe, 2002; Novak 
& Schwabe, 2009; Rensmann & Smits, 2008; Rossignoli, Carugati, & Mola, 2009). 
Especially the term „cybermediary‟ has become quite popular since its introduction by 
Mitra Barun Sarkar, Brian Butler and Charles Steinfield in their influential (566 
citations according to Google Scholar) 1995 paper on the continuing roles of mediating 
players in electronic marketplaces (Sarkar, Butler, & Steinfield, 1995). The paper is a 
response and indeed rebuttal to the so called “disintermediation hypothesis”, a broad 
prediction that was made since the end of the 1980s by several researchers and that 
forecasted the disappearance of intermediaries due to lower transaction costs when two 
market participants interact directly over the Internet. Sarkar et al. (1995) in their 
response argue that in contrast to these claims for disintermediation, intermediaries still 
play a role in electronic marketplaces and might, under certain circumstances, become 
even more important than their non-electronic counterparts. To prove their claim, they 
use a dyadic transaction model that depicts a transaction between a buyer and a seller in 
comparison with a transaction between a seller and an intermediary and between an 
intermediary and a buyer respectively. However, their model makes simplifying 
assumptions about environmental factors and behavioral patterns of market participants. 
This limits the explanatory scope of the model.  
Therefore the goal of this paper is twofold: First of all we want to recapitulate Sarkar et 
al.‟s arguments and try to identify key assumptions in their line of reasoning. We 
illustrate our points by examples from the tourism industry, which exhibits multiple 
facets of intermediation. Thus the tourism industry provides a rich environment to study 
the phenomenon of intermediation in electronic marketplaces. Moreover, we have 
reviewed the existing body of literature on intermediation. By following this approach 
we deliberately increase the level of model complexity in order to achieve a more 
differentiated understanding of the phenomenon of IT-enabled intermediation. This 
leads us to the second contribution of this paper, the identification of future research 
directions addressing interesting and little explored aspects of electronic intermediation. 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we will recapitulate the paper of Sarkar 
et al. (1995). In section 3 we extend the model by contrasting central assumptions with 
examples from the tourism industry and recent research. Section 4 discusses the 
findings and makes future research suggestions. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Sarkar, Butler & Steinfield, (1995) 
The paper of Sarkar et al. (1995) addresses the “disintermediation hypothesis”, which 
forecasted the disappearance of intermediaries in markets due to the advent of 
ubiquitously available electronic networks where buyers and sellers meet and transact 
directly
1
. Advocates of the disintermediation hypothesis have used a transaction cost 
rationale, stating that market transactions via the Internet are cheaper in terms of 
                                                 
1 Sarkar et al. (1995) use the term „National Information Infrastructure“ (NII) and compare the traditional 
situation  (without the possibilities of the NII) with the situation where market participants can make use 
of the possibilities of the NII after its introduction. We set the term NII synonymous to „Internet‟ and use 
the latter term throughout this article. 
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transaction costs than on traditional, offline markets. Malone, Yates and Benjamin, in 
their seminal 1987 article, predicted a general move to the market because IT reduces 
transaction costs and enables market participants to conduct transactions on electronic 
markets at comparatively lower cost than on traditional markets. Along with this, 
brokers would become dispensable, because electronic markets can fulfill many of the 
same functions like traditional brokers in connecting buyers and sellers. Malone et al. 
(1987) called this the “electronic brokerage effect” (Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987). 
Benjamin and Wigand (1995) described how the information infrastructure might affect 
value chains and redistribute profits along them. They show with an example how the 
price of a shirt could drop by more than 60 % if wholesalers and retailers would be cut 
out of the value chain (Benjamin & Wigand, 1995). 
 
Sarkar et al. (1995) modify and extend Benjamin and Wigand‟s disintermediation 
argument. Two key assumptions are identified that formed the basis of prevalent 
analyses about threatened intermediaries. The first key assumption says that, with a 
ubiquitous information infrastructure in place, transaction costs are zero (insignificant) 
while the second key assumptions states that all transactions are atomic, i.e. not 
dividable into smaller units. Both assumptions have been recognized as problematic. 
Regarding the first assumption they state that it is very unlikely that all transaction costs 
are reduced to zero, but instead still incur non-negligible costs that are different for 
different classes of transactions.  
Sarkar et al. (1995) apply a transaction cost-based rationale to prove in a semi-formal 
way that disintermediation is only one of four possible effects of an ubiquitous 
information infrastructure (see Figure 1). The model delineates dyadic transactions 
taking place between a producer of an unspecified product, a consumer and an 
intermediary. They show that there are four possible outcomes regarding intermediation, 




Figure 1: Model showing dyadic transactions between a producer, a consumer and an 
intermediary. Based on (Sarkar, Butler & Steinfield, 1995). 
 
Scenario 1 in Figure 2 shows the possibility of a direct producer-consumer market that 
is reinforced by the possibilities of the Internet. Sector 2 depicts the scenario of 
disintermediation. Sector 3 represents a new breed of intermediaries that Sarkar et al. 
(1995) called “cybermediaries”. These IT-enabled intermediaries provide transaction-
supporting services that enable market transactions at a lower cost then via a direct 
transaction between producer and consumer, even though such a transaction might have 
been cheaper before the possibilities of the Internet became available. Sector 4 describes 
Benjamin Rensmann, Stefan Klein   
 
424 
reinforced traditional intermediaries that use the possibilities of the Internet to 
supplement their existing market position.  
 
 
Figure 2: The four outcomes regarding intermediation in markets that result from a comparison 
of transaction costs before and after the advent of the Internet. Based on: (Sarkar, Butler & 
Steinfield, 1995). 
 
Regarding the second key assumption of the disintermediation hypothesis, Sarkar et al. 
(1995) argue that transactions are not atomic and indivisible, but rather consist of 
different parts, which should be regarded in more detail. In order to support their 
argument they provide a differentiated list of cybermediaries‟ functions and transaction-
supporting services. 
3 Extending the Model of Sarkar et al. (1995) 
Sarkar et al.‟s (1995) paper was obviously not intended as an exhaustive analysis of the 
phenomenon of intermediation in electronic markets. The authors particularly point out 
that they use a simple model in order to prove their argument (Sarkar, Butler, & 
Steinfield, 1995). What the model fails to explain is, however, to what degree the 
predicted shifts are supposed to happen and what contextual circumstances lead to what 
outcome, or whether one outcome will dominate under certain circumstances. 
Furthermore it does not become clear how exactly the roles played by intermediaries or 
cybermediaries influence the relative cost advantages of the different outcomes, with 
implications to how an intermediary business model should look like that realizes these 
advantages or how a supplier should design a multi-channel distribution strategy.  
 
The tourism industry knows many different kinds of intermediaries and provides plenty 
of evidence of dis-, re- and cyber-mediation. In the remainder of this chapter we will 
use evidence from the tourism industry for a critical examination of their model, in 
order to illustrate some of the above mentioned points.. We will also point to published 
research on intermediaries and intermediation. The following discussion focuses on 
three different aspects: Market topology, types and roles of intermediation in the market 
and market dynamics. 
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3.1 Market Topology 
Sarkar et al. (1995) compare the transaction costs of a direct producer-consumer 
exchange with an intermediated exchange consisting of a transaction between supplier 
and intermediary and between intermediary and consumer. This simplistic view neglects 
the topology and nature of a market. The model depicts one intermediary, one supplier 
and one consumer. However, this is only an exceptional and rare case, because 
intermediaries typically provide a link between multiple suppliers and multiple 
consumers. Often there are also several intermediaries involved in fulfilling a 
customer‟s need. This results in a n:m:o topology. Werthner and Klein depict the 
tourism market as having a network-like topology, with the consumers (tourists) on one 
side and the suppliers (primary suppliers, e.g. airlines and hotels) on the other side 
(Werthner & Klein, 1999). The network in between consists of different classes of 
players with varying types of relationships: “The specific characteristic of travel and 
tourism is that on the supply side the industry acts as a network where different 
suppliers as well as intermediaries cooperate in order to offer the final product and to 
service the consumer” (Werthner & Klein, 1999). 
For the sake of clarification we assume a one tier distribution system for now, involving 
retail intermediaries and a variety of different suppliers and customers with different 
preferences. A good example is the market for flight tickets with many different airlines 
as suppliers, travel agents or online travel portals as intermediaries and travelers being 
customers with different profiles (leisure vs. business travelers, luxury-oriented vs. 
budget-oriented travelers). In the following we describe different aspects that result 
from this extended topological view for suppliers, intermediaries and customers: 
 
 Suppliers: The structure of the market influences the channel choice of a 
supplier (direct vs. intermediated). In a market like the airline ticket market, with 
a lot of competition and many intermediaries in the value chain, choosing the 
right channel strategy is crucial for the airlines. Many no-frills airlines like 
Ryanair or Easyjet choose to exclusively sell their tickets directly on their own 
company websites. Marketing channels might also be combined, using various 
intermediaries as well as direct selling in order to optimally reach customers 
with different preferences. The power of big online travel portals should not be 
neglected, as they provide search economies for customers and it is important 
for an airline to get a good position in the search results. Furthermore suppliers 
need to understand customers‟ needs and preferences, which often include the 
need for combining several suppliers in travel packages (flight + hotel + rental 
car) and a wide range of offers to choose from. 
 Intermediaries: Intermediaries address customer needs as well supplier needs. 
For customers they provide, amongst others, comparison shopping, independent 
advice and assurance. An example is Travelocity, a travel portal that acts as a 
cybermediary connecting consumers with many different suppliers (flights, 
hotels, rental car etc.) (Inkpen, 1998). Supplier needs include market access, 
distribution efficiencies and the proper addressing of customer needs. Online 
travel portals like Travelocity fulfill these tasks, however, at a certain cost. 
Additionally intermediaries on the same level of the distribution chain compete 
against each other for suppliers and customers. 
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 Customers: As indicated above, consumer needs in the tourism sector are 
usually fulfilled by a conglomerate of services provided by a variety of suppliers 
and intermediaries, some of which are complementary and dependent upon each 
other. I.e., there is a difference for a consumer when choosing between different 
suppliers for one and the same product (e.g. flight) or between different 
suppliers for different products (e.g. flight, hotel, rental car). The difference in 
complexity and search cost might influence the choice between an intermediated 
purchase via a travel platform, which integrates the different suppliers for a 
vacation, and direct interactions with the suppliers. Other factors that influence 
this choice are market structure and competencies of the customer. If the market 
is highly fragmented on the supply side, customers might prefer an intermediary, 
e.g. if travelers are looking for hostels or small hotels, which exist in a lot of 
different sizes and forms in big cities. In contrast, when booking a flight on a 
well-served route (e.g. Frankfurt – London), budget-oriented travelers might first 
look for rates at the websites of no-frills airlines. Older or less experienced 
travelers might not have the competencies or motivation to book their trip online 
and prefer the traditional brick-and-mortar travel agent with personal advice. 
 
As we include these considerations into the transaction model of Sarkar et al. (1995), a 
more complicated model results. Figure 3 shows a market topology that includes 
multiple intermediaries, multiple customers (segments) and multiple suppliers for every 
service. Services (flight, hotel room, rental car) from different suppliers (airlines, hotels 
and car rentals) are necessary to fulfill a customer‟s need (e.g. a holiday trip). Different 
intermediaries are competing against each other, so the customer has to choose one or 
many to book his holidays. If the traveler is booking directly, she has to conduct three 
distinct transactions (T1a, T1b and T1c). Suppliers have to take a lot more options into 
account when designing their multi-channel strategy. Different customer segments can 
be reached either directly, or via a multitude of intermediated channels, raising 
questions about customer relationship management. 
 
 
Figure 3: Extended model taking into account a more complex market topology. 
 
The nature of the linkage between intermediaries and supplier and buyers is another 
point neglected in the model of Sarkar et al. (1995). Some intermediaries are suppliers‟ 
agents, some are customers‟ agents and others are neutral market agents. (Klein & 
Teubner, 2000). E.g. Sabre is an intermediary that initially connected travel agents with 
Sarkar, Butler & Steinfield (1995) “Intermediaries and Cybermediaries” Revisited 
 
427 
primary suppliers (small hotels, providers of cultural and entertainment activities etc.). 
Sabre was founded by American Airlines (suppliers‟ agent) and initially gave 
preference to American Airlines‟ flights (Hopper, 1990; Riemer & Lehrke, 2009). The 
travel guide platform Lonely Planet acts as a buyers‟ agent by providing 
recommendations and evaluations of tourism products and destinations to travelers
2
.   
3.2 Types and Roles of Intermediation in the Market 
As indicated in the previous section, intermediaries play several roles in markets like 
product search, bundling, provision of market access and many more. It is important to 
note that the variety of roles that intermediaries play result from the complexity of 
different market topologies. On the other hand, relationships between intermediaries are 
subject to specific governance structures like cooperations. Thus additional criteria are 
needed to analyze the roles and added value (for the different market participants) of 
those intermediary constellations. 
 
Choudhury and Konsynski (1998) analyze intermediaries in terms of transaction cost 
efficiencies and identify two different kinds of scale economies that intermediaries offer 
to buyers: search economies and exchange economies. A buyer can profit from search 
economies if her product mix uncertainty is high, which means that the buyer purchases 
a different product in each transaction and is uncertain of what product to purchase in 
the next transaction. Market variability leads to high search costs either if a market is 
highly fragmented or is highly volatile. An intermediary in a market realizes exchange 
economies by bundling different products from a variety of suppliers in one single 
transaction, thereby reducing the costs of the necessary information exchanges 
(Choudhury & Konsynski, 1998). This distinction between search and exchange 
economies provides a classification approach for classifying common services 
intermediaries are offering. Table 1 gives a non-exhaustive overview of services and 
examples from the tourism sector addressing search and exchange economies. 
                                                 
2 http://www.lonelyplanet.com/. 
















Search Travelocity and Expedia are online travel supermarkets that enable 
search across a range of tourism products (flights, hotels, rental cars). 
Evaluations and 
ratings 
By evaluating hotels and providing reviews about travel destinations, 
Travelocity and Expedia help customers finding the optimal balance 
between price and quality 
Needs assessment Lonely Planet is a travel portal for young, independent and budget-
aware travelers. It gathers a lot of information and travel 
recommendations about worldwide destinations on its web portal and 
helps customers to find a travel destination that matches their own travel 















Bundling Travelocity and Expedia bundle tourism products for customers, so that 




Online travel supermarket makes suggestions for product configurations, 
e.g. suggest a hotel near the airport of arrival when booking a flight 
Table 1: Overview of common intermediary roles in the tourism market addressing search and 
exchange economies 
The variety of different roles and the complex topology of the tourism market raise the 
question of the significance for the market participants. Booking platforms like hotel.de 
or hotels.com enable the booking of hotel rooms and act as transaction processors 
between the suppliers (hotels) and the customers. In contrast, a travel portal like 
tripadvisor.com only bundles price information about hotel rooms, but does not mediate 
the real booking. The business model of these providers is not based on raising a fee for 
handling the actual transaction, but on click-through commissions they receive from the 
booking platforms they refer to. A further difference needs to be made between service 
complementors and intermediaries. If a customer books a flight via a travel agent, it is 
usually only of little importance to him which player maintains the airport facilities, 
provides in-flight meals or the shuttle to the airport. These services complement the core 
product (i.e., the flight), however, if something goes wrong the customer might as well 
blame the travel agent (although the travel agent is not responsible). This illustrates the 
role an intermediary plays for the customer even beyond a certain market transaction. 
 
There is a trend on the tourism market towards highly integrated platforms like online 
supermarkets on the one hand and highly specialized services in terms of service scope 
and customer segmentation on the other hand. Examples for the latter are the search 
engine qfly.com for discount airlines and luxurytravel.com for extravagant journeys. 
This leads to complex architectures of service and intermediary configurations and 
makes it difficult to compare intermediary types and roles. Comparison is especially 
difficult if services are provided in multiple steps, involving several intermediaries or 
service providers and if different business models are combined in order to integrate 
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additional services for customers. Airlines e.g. become intermediaries themselves by 
offering third party services complementing their own core product (the flight). 
Examples here are no-frills carriers like Ryanair or Easyjet, offering hotels, rental cars 
and insurances to their customers in the course of their booking process. This 
development can be characterized as an extension of the direct sales models, as shown 
in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Airlines offer complementing services by third parties to their customers and thus 
fulfill an intermediating role. 
 
Highly integrated and specialized business models lead to different transaction 
characteristics and multiple relationships between the players. While Sarkar et al. 
(1995) point to the fact that transactions are not atomic and that the single parts of the 
transaction can be supported by different cybermediary services, we find that actors 
carry out different kinds of transactions in the context of compound tourism services 
like a holiday trip. Complementing services can most often be booked separately. 
Airlines e.g. use upselling techniques which enable customers to upgrade their travel 
class, use priority boarding or be allowed to take extra luggage. Intermediaries, by 
selling complementing services like insurances or phone cards, also conduct different 




Figure 5: Extension of the Sarkar et al. (1995)-model with multiple transactional relationships, 
depicting different characters of transactions 
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3.3 Market Dynamics and Competition 
The continuously changing intermediation structure in a market such as the tourism 
market is highly contingent on industry characteristics and the competitive market 
environment. Sarkar et al. (1995) implicitly assume some kind of dynamism by saying 
that there are four different outcomes possible with the Internet in place. However, they 
do not explain whether or not transitions are possible between the different scenarios in 
Figure 2, and if yes, what kind of transitions might occur under what circumstances. An 
interesting question would e.g. be, how threatened intermediaries can make use of the 
possibilities of the Internet in order to strengthen their market position (and thus move 
to sector 4). The lack of evolutionary aspects in previous work on disintermediation and 
its short-term character were also mentioned by other researchers. Chircu and Kauffman 
(2000) elaborate on these aspects in their “intermediation, disintermediation, and 
reintermediation-” (IDR-) framework (Chircu & Kauffman, 2000). They identify three 
distinct phases: The intermediation phase, the disintermediation phase and the 
reintermediation phase. These three phases occur, according to Chircu and Kauffman, 
in cycles and repeatedly with every e-commerce innovation that is introduced in a 
market. Intermediation means the entry of a new, IT-enabled e-commerce player 
(cybermediary) in a market, leading to the disintermediation of established players. 
Reintermediation occurs when an established player regains ground by the likewise 
utilization of e-commerce technologies, complementing its traditional business model 
(Chircu & Kauffman, 2000). When observing the rapid changes in the tourism industry 
that occurred over the last two decades it becomes difficult though to identify cycles or 
regularly recurring patterns of intermediation, disintermediation and reintermediation in 
this industry. Instead, different moves of different players that lead to inter-, dis-, re- or 
cybermediation of certain players happen at the same time and contribute to a 
continuously changing market picture. 
 
Since the advent of cybermediaries like Travelocity or Expedia, the main street travel 
agent from around the corner became a threatened species. The declining number of 
traditional travel agents is a fact in many countries
3
. Many customers now configure 
their trips online. Cybermediaries like Expedia and other online travel supermarkets 
enable customers to build their own trip from a wide range of options, combining 
flights, hotels and rental cars according to their own itinerary
4
. Nevertheless, not only 
since the rise of no-frills airlines like Ryanair that sell tickets exclusively via their own 
website, airlines are trying to sell tickets directly to customers, using their own website 
as distribution channel, thereby bypassing cybermediaries (Inkpen, 1998). In response 
to intense price competition, United Airlines has even offered a best price guarantee on 
its Web site clearly aimed at establishing their direct sales as their primary distribution 
channel
5
. Another illustrative example is American Airlines, which has not renewed 
contracts with two intermediaries (Orbitz, Opodo) because it claims that the 
intermediaries do not properly endorse their new pricing model
6
. This phenomenon 
                                                 
3 In Germany, the number of travel agencies is declining since many years, see: 
http://www.drv.de/index.php?id=548&no_cache=1&sword_list[0]=travel&sword_list[1]=agents. 




6 See http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/business/05air.html?_r=2&hpw. 
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could also be called “dis-cybermediation”, which means that the cybermediaries, once 
seen as disintermediation threat, become threatened themselves. 
Because airlines can offer consumers privileged access to their own products by running 
promotions, offering better seat assignment, cancellation policies, upgrades and frequent 
traveller awards, which are not available for travel intermediaries, their behaviour has 
been criticised as “predatory disintermediation”. Predatory disintermediation aims at 
intensifying the competition in the industry and cutting out intermediaries by adapting 
the airlines‟ own distribution channel in a way that makes it impossible for 
intermediaries to compete with it (Berghel, 2000).  
 
However, as more and more airlines establish their own, direct distribution channel, 
customers are faced with increasing complexity and search costs, making a complete 
disintermediation of cybermediaries and travel agents unlikely. On the contrary: 
Traditional travel agents apparently still play an important role in fulfilling customer‟s 
individual travel needs and there are plenty of examples of successful reintermediation. 
Many traditional travel agents now maintain their own websites with travel information 
and booking possibilities in addition to their existing network of stores
7
. Another 
phenomenon which was described by Chircu and Kauffman (2000) can also be observed 
in the tourism industry: The new intermediaries make their technologies and platforms 
available to other players in the market and thus turn into technology providers (Chircu 
& Kauffman, 2000). E.g. Sabre was founded as computer reservation system by 
American Airlines, offering flight reservation services to travel agencies. Nowadays 
Sabre is a versatile service provider serving travel agencies, corporations, governance 
agencies and suppliers
8
. Sabre also owns Travelocity, one of the large online travel 
supermarkets, which competes with the travel agencies. 
 
The ongoing movements of the different players - intermediaries and tourism principals 
- reflect the intensity of competition in the fragmented and volatile tourism market. 
Intermediaries try to gain an advantage by negotiating exclusive deals with tourism 
principals. Hotel.de, for example, offers “best deals” with certain hotels or little extras, 
like a bottle of water, for customers that book their stay on hotel.de
9
. On an alternative 
hotel-platform, hrs.com, customers might get cheaper stays for various hotels, as 
hrs.com is promoting their “exclusive price”, guaranteeing a price which is 10 % lower 




These various examples illustrate the dynamic nature of the tourism market in terms of 
intermediaries with innovative business models entering the market, intermediaries 
exiting the market and the various competitive moves the players are engaged in in 
order to gain ground and reach the customer. 
4 Discussion 
The tourism industry is an example of a highly fragmented industry with multiple 
players at each level of the distribution chain. We find a co-existence of intermediation, 
                                                 
7 See e.g. American Express (http://www.americanexpress.com) and STA Travel 
(http://www.statravel.com/). 
8 See http://www.sabretravelnetwork.com/home/products_services/product_index/. 
9 See http://www.hotel.info/homepage.aspx?lng=EN 
10 See http://www.hrs.com 
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disintermediation and an increasing number of cybermediation with a broad and 
differentiated range of value propositions and roles. This complexity creates the 
necessity to thoroughly distinguish between the different roles and perspectives of the 
market participants in order to analyze the benefits and drawbacks of intermediaries and 
the overall intermediation structure. Taking the perspective of a supplier, e.g. an airline, 
the question of selling directly to consumers or using an intermediated channel is one of 
choosing the right multi-channel-strategy. Most airlines pursue a multi-channel-strategy 
by using direct as well as intermediated sales via multiple intermediaries, with some 
even creating their own new intermediary channel (e.g. Orbitz.com or Opodo.com). On 
the other hand, we showed that many airlines are trying to strengthen their direct sales 
channel by using “predatory” means and sometimes even compete against their own 
intermediary spin-offs. From a customer‟s point of view the question of buying directly 
from the supplier or using an intermediary is likely to be related to the complexity and 
the size of the search space relative to their own expertise and risk preference. When the 
choice of the airline is obvious due to the offered route (and price), customers are likely 
to go the direct way. Whenever customers want a comparison across different airlines 
(and alliances), cybermediaries can help to reduce search (i.e. comparison) costs. 
Experimental research might be a way to study consumer‟s behavior in choosing an 
intermediary or going directly to the supplier. 
 
From an intermediary‟s point of view, in order to survive and thrive, it is not only 
important to be aware of the existing supply and match this to customer‟s wishes (i.e., to 
have a good business model), but also to watch out for disintermediation threats coming 
from unexpected sides. Predatory disintermediation makes it very difficult for travel 
portals offering typical tourism services like flight and hotel booking to respond 
properly, as they simply cannot get access to the conditions the tourism suppliers are 
offering their clients directly. They need to find the right strategy to cope with this, 
which might be the introduction of better search services among many different 
suppliers or including travelers to improve services through e.g. customers‟ reviews and 
recommendations. With some extreme examples of predatory disintermediation it might 
even be worth to check the matter with the anti-trust authorities. Another reason for the 
disintermediation of single intermediaries is competition amongst intermediaries. There 
is an intense competition between different intermediaries who offer travel agency 
functions online (online travel platforms) and those with specific business models, such 
as Priceline, which is offering a patented name-your-own-price model, or Tripadvisor, 
which is a platform particularly for customer generated travel information but also links 
to online travel agencies for quotes. 
 
The channel structure in the tourism sector is changing rapidly and continuously due to 
the intense competition between the many different players in the industry. This forces 
the competitors – supplier and intermediaries alike – to constantly be aware of new 
technological and product-related innovations and to react quickly in case the own 
market position is at stake. It might be dangerous for suppliers or intermediaries to 
depend too much on the consumer, as opportunism and cherry-picking from a large 
range of offerings makes consumer behaviour rather unpredictable. Also with new 
developments like Web 2.0 and social networking at hand, consumers trust fellow 
travellers‟ recommendations more than those of suppliers and intermediaries. In order to 
be able to analyze these issues, other viewpoints than the widely and often exclusively 
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used transaction cost theory should be taken to explain aspects of intermediation in 
markets, as suggested by Jin and Robey (1999). They e.g. propose the use of consumer 
choice theory (CCT) for analyzing the economic benefits of intermediaries. CCT states 
that consumers are producing final desires instead of just purchasing single goods or 
products. A vacation with the goal of relaxing can be such a final desire. However, the 
fulfillment of this final desire depends on a variety of complementing products and 
services that the consumer needs to purchase (e.g. flight, hotel, rental car, activities), the 
time and energy the individual spends for its “production”, i.e. combination of the 
booked products (planning activities, preparing for the trip etc.) and the ability to do so 
(e.g. with the support of travel-guide portals like Lonely Planet). Jin and Robey also 
suggest other theories for analyzing intermediation like social network theories, 
knowledge broker theory and institutional theory (Jin & Robey, 1999). 
 
In sum, the tourism industry has become a complex ecosystem of co-existing and 
competing models of intermediated and direct distribution. The level of competition 
reflects the number of relevant players at the respective stages of the value chain as well 
as upstream competition. Many of the outcomes can be explained (ex post) by using a 
transaction cost rationale, however, relative cost advantages for the respective players 
and transaction attributes (frequency, information asymmetry, uncertainty) need to be 
taken into account. Also previous work mainly focused on dyadic relationships and 
decisions of single players towards or against using an intermediary or on the business 
models of single intermediaries. Moreover, we found an enduring role of specific 
contingencies (operated routes, price policy, patented business models, …), which 
reflect strategic choices of the economic actors. 
 
What is needed are ways that enable a better analysis of the factors that drive or hinder 
intermediation in markets. In addition approaches to conduct a strategic analysis of the 
relevant market power of actors and the dependencies between them are needed. The 
American Airlines case (see chapter 3.3) illustrates the relevance of this problem. 
 
Another problem is the complexity of intermediation and distribution structures which 
is closely related to issues of specialization, innovation and division of work. One way 
to manage this complexity might be through the use of typologies or configurations. The 
idea of configuration analysis is to identify a manageable number of archetypes or 
generic constellations – configurations - which describe a wide variety of existing actor 
constellations. Thereby these configurations take actors‟ strategies, the structure of the 
actor constellations and the environment into account (Miller, 1986). The goal of 
typologies is the identification of ideal types on the basis of different dimensions. The 
ideal types can be used as a standard of comparison for real world examples to compare 
them with and see how well they approximate them. A typology, if thoroughly 
identified and defined, is a theory in itself, which can be used to explain observed 
phenomena (Doty & Glick, 1994). Mintzberg‟s five organizational patterns are a well 
known example (Mintzberg, 1983). Analyzing intermediation at the level of 
configurations or ideal types would differ from the approach of analyzing decisions of 
single players in dyadic relationships (towards or against using an intermediary), which 
is the common stance taken when discussing intermediation in markets. By taking a 
broader stance, configurational analysis also allows to more accurately account for a 
multitude of intermediation contexts and their dynamics, a better recognition of 
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changing boundary conditions and the integration of multiple theoretical views 
(Lyytinen & Damsgaard, 2011). Furthermore it reveals the complexity from the 
perspective of different customer segments and enables a more thorough analysis of 
coordination costs customers are faced with. The same segment of customers might use 
different intermediation services in different situations. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The goal of this work was to recapitulate the paper of Sarkar et al. (1995) and to reflect 
its key assumptions using evidence from the tourism market. By taking more factors 
into account, we increase the complexity compared to the original model, which enables 
the identification of important issues that should not be neglected when discussing the 
phenomenon of intermediation in markets. Based on these issues, chapter 4 gave some 
suggestions for future research. 
With respect to the model of Sarkar et al. (1995), it can be stated that no clear answer 
can be given to the question to what degree the amount of intermediation changes in a 
market (in terms of more or less intermediaries) as a result of the introduction of ICT as 
an exogenuous force. What we see is that different distribution channels co-exist and 
that intermediaries are part of the multi-channel distribution strategy of tourism 
suppliers, next to direct selling strategies. 
The evolution of intermediation in markets is also highly contingent on industry 
characteristics. Product and service characteristics influence the opportunities for 
cybermediaries and the evolution of the industry structure (Klein & Teubner, 2000). 
Tickets or bookings are non-transferable contracts that are not even written out on paper 
anymore (e-ticket). The fixed costs are often very high due to high investments in e.g. 
airplanes and hotel facilities. There are plenty of possibilities for product bundling and 
differential pricing, the product complexity can be high and the price sensitivity of 
customers varies (independent traveller vs. luxury-seeking tourist). This is a playground 
for intermediaries and offers plenty of opportunities for IT-based business models that 
support consumers in evaluating the different options and helps suppliers to find new 
sales channels for their products.  
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